Athens Dialogues Two
When the Onassis Cultural centre in Athens was first conceived (see previous post), its initiators could not have imagined the crisis of the city, the country and the international economic order into which it would be born.
The orginal high ambitions of its first event - to hold Athens Dialogues about the contribution that Greek thought could make to modern problems - seemed even higher when the massed bands of international philosophers, historians, literary critics, political theorists, neuuroscientists and mathematicians, ktl (as they say in Greece) arrived at the golden-egg-in-the-glass-box past streets of uncollected rubbish, closed shops, empty offices and angry Athenian graffiti (only some of it it directed against our German friends).
The British philosopher, Simon Critchley, sounded an early warning that the Dialogue form of debate was no soft option.
In a culture when opinion is more fashionable than reasoning, and sensitivity to others' opinions is too often preferred to the stiletto needed to change minds, there was always the danger that we would have the The Athens Monologues instead.
At the end, after four days of talking, it was clear that some speakers had noted (or hardly needed to note) what Critchley had said, that others had struggled succesfully to abandon pre-prepared nostra, and others would probably never do so.
For a first event - in a place of high ambitions for future events - this was a very fine result.
The last session took place in what seemed a spirit of genuine self-criticicism.
There seemed significant support for the idea that next time there should be more 'going live' against other speakers and less statement of opinions that had died many decades before.
Questions - in the Socratic style - might be better than themes.
Greek materialist philosophy had been neglected. Too much Plato not enough Democritus or Epicurus. The TLS representative strongly seconded that.
Much time and sincerity had been spent thanking the organisers, arguably more than either politeness or economy required. But let me stray myself here. The Byzantinist, Dr Niki Tsironis, the conference's Academic Coordinator, much tried time-keeper and tireless attender at very moment's talking, could not be congratulated enough if we were all still there.
Critchley declared himself still 'just alive' on Saturday evening - and ended, as he began, with the admonition that dialogue is not the exchange of opinion in an atmosphere where everyone's opinion counts the same, that dialogue requires speakers to try to change minds not to comfort them, and that we could all do better as the noble process continued.
There seemed popular agreement that Greek politicians - temporary custodians of a palpably 'broken system' - could have usefully given up their own debates for a few days and joined ours. Politicians everywhere, of course, are among the very worst at dialogue - as every day's listening to them reminds us.
The Athens garbage strike, part of the non-verbal Greek protest against the German view of their economy, seemed yesterday, however, to be coming to an end.


Sir Peter: I am going to send you the Brean article in the National Post that I mention here. Who from the Athens Dialogues do you think would be best able to respond? Perhaps Simon Critchley.
Joseph Brean: On philosophers and data (re your article on Hauser): An interesting test might be to assess the work of Linda Palmer on rats and Kant's "Critique of Judgement." (I like the Oxford World's Classics text of Kant's third critique, edited by Nicholas Walker).
It seems to me that some of the refinements in Trolley experiments (including Hauser's recent twist with anti-depressants) are becoming increasingly factitious.
Terry McDermott's "101 Theory Drive" contains some material on Palmer. I do not see anything at all in her rat and Kant work that would shed light on philosophy, but I would be open to persuasion.
"101 Theory Drive" is almost as good as Siddhartha Mukherjee's "The Emperor of All Maladies," which makes it a very good book.
My reading of "Moral Minds" by Hauser is that he is afflicted by triviality.
The real issues in life--why students can't read "The Wings of the Dove" by Henry James--why undergrads in America are not exposed to a penetrating analysis of his "The Beast in the Jungle" in first year--will never yield to Hauser's (or Palmer's) experimental analysis.
Reality is in another place. Could you illuminate the involution of John Marcher with a Trolley experiment? Could you get at why the policy implications of "101 Theory Drive" have been largely ignored?
Clayton Burns PhD Vancouver 604 222 1286.
[Kant and the brain: A new empirical hypothesis (extended version) Linda Palmer Department of Philosophy, Carnegie Mellon University
Contact information: Department of Philosophy 135 Baker Hall Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 lpalmer@cmu.edu
(412) 268-8046]
Posted by: Clayton Burns | 29 Nov 2010 19:33:49
In [Brian] Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog: (here on The New York Times's philosophy blog):
[Oddly, several "Stone" blog slots have been given over to non-philosophers not really writing about philosophy, but this week, the Times hit a new low with a lecturer in French at Cambridge University named Andy Martin (who, I gather, is a friend of Critchley's) explaining that philosophers are autistic, and that the dearth of women in philosophy is due to the fact that autism is more common in men.
Seriously. This bit of venal stupidity provoked some sharp and apt comments from philosophers.]
Perhaps Mary could follow up with an investigative piece on Andy Martin. And Simon could investigate Simon.
This is chronic. I wanted to see if there was current material on the Athens Dialogues at Leiter's blog.
Posted by: Clayton Burns | 29 Nov 2010 19:56:18